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Summary
False memories are the erroneous recollection of events that did not actually occur. False memories have been broadly investigated 
within the domain of long-term memory, while studies involving short-term memory are less common and provide a far less detailed 
‘picture’ of this phenomenon. We tested participants in a short-term memory task involving lists of four semantically related words 
that had to be matched with a probe word. Crucially, the probe word could be one of the four words of the list, it could be semantically 
related to them, or it could be semantically unrelated to the list. Participants had to decide whether the probe was in the list. To this task 
we added articulatory suppression to impair rehearsal, concurrent material to remember, and changes to the visual appearance of the 
probes to assess the mechanism involved in short-term memory retrieval. The results showed that, similarly to the studies on long-
term memory, false memories emerged more frequently for probes semantically related to the list and when rehearsal was impaired by 
concurrent material. The visual appearance of the stimuli did not play an important role. This set of results suggests that deep semantic 
processing, rather than only superficial visual processing, is taking place within a few seconds from the presentation of the probes. 
Keywords: false memories; short-term memory; consciousness; semantic processing. 
Özet
Sahte anılar aslında meydana gelmemiş/yaşanmamış olayların hatalı bir şekilde hatırlanmasıdır. Kısa süreli belleği içeren çalışmalar daha az yaygın ve bu fenomenin çok daha 
az detaylı bir “resmini” ortaya koymaktayken, sahte anılar uzun süreli belleğin alanı içerisinde geniş kapsamda araştırılmıştır. Çalışma kapsamında, katılımcıları birbiriyle 
semantik olarak ilişkili ve araştırılan kelime ile eşleştirilme zorunluluğu olan dört kelimelik listeleri içeren bir kısa süreli hafıza görevi ile test ettik. Kritik olarak, araştırılan 
kelime listedeki dört kelimeden biri, listedeki kelimelerle semantik olarak ilişkili, ya da listedeki kelimelerle semantik olarak ilişkisiz olabilirdi. Katılımcıların araştırılan 
kelimenin listede olup olmadığına karar vermeleri gerekmekteydi. Bu ödeve, kısa süreli bellekten geri çağırma mekanizmasını değerlendirmek için tekrarlamayı/prova etmeyi 
bozacak fonolojik baskılama, hatırlamayı eşzamanlı materyal ve araştırılan kelimenin görsel görünümüne değişiklikler ekledik. Sonuçlar, uzun süreli bellek çalışmalarına 
benzer şekilde, tekrarlama eşzamanlı materyallerle bozulduğunda ve araştırılan kelimeler listeyle semantik olarak ilişkili olduğunda sahte anıların daha sıklıkla ortaya çıktığını 
göstermiştir. Uyaranın görsel görünümünün önemli bir rolü yoktur. Bu sonuçlar kümesi, yüzeysel görsel süreçler yerine, derin semantik işlemenin araştırılan kelimelerin 
gösterilmesinden sonraki birkaç saniye içerisinde gerçekleştiğini göstermektedir. 
Anahtar Kelimeler:  sahte anlılar, kısa süreli bellek, bilinç , semantik işleme
1. Introduction
Memory can be fallible. Information in long-term 
memory (LTM) can either be successfully recalled or 
forgotten. Besides failing to remember events that 
actually occurred, two interesting errors can arise during 
recall or recognition: remembering events that did not 
happen or remembering them differently (Clancy et al., 
2002; Loftus, 1996). In particular, a class of the former 
is referred to as ‘false memories’ (Deese, 1959; Jou 
& Flores, 2013; Pasqualotto et al., 2013; Robinson & 
Roediger, 1997; Roediger & Mcdermott, 1995; Roediger 
et al., 2001). Theories of false memory generally consider 
LTM, including associative activation or source monitoring 
failures (Collins & Loftus, 1975; Flegal et al., 2010; 
Quillian, 1967). False long-term memories are reliably 
produced with the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) 
paradigm (Deese, 1959; Roediger & Mcdermott, 1995). 
In classic DRM experiments, participants listen to lists 
of words semantically related to a single non-studied 
theme, or ‘related lure’ (e.g Roediger et al., 2001). For 
example, participants may hear (or read): thread, pin, 
eye, etc., all semantically associated to the related lure 
needle. Then participants attempt to recall the list, 
usually through a free-recall or a recognition test, which 
includes studied words, non-studied related words and 
non-studied unrelated words. The results from most 
DRM experiments (e.g. Roediger & Mcdermott, 1995) 
demonstrate that participants falsely recall non-studied 
related words. Moreover Roediger and colleagues found 
that confidence ratings, or remember-know (where 
‘remember’ entails that an individual can consciously 
remember  the occurrence of an episode, or whether s/
he can only vaguely ‘know’ that it happened), indicate 
that participants are fairly confident in recognizing the 
non-studied related word as a studied word (Rajaram & 
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Roediger, 1997). 
Although the majority of research on false memory has 
been focused on LTM, research on short-term memory 
(STM) illustrates that this system is also vulnerable to 
various interferences such as phonological and visual 
similarity (Nairne, 2002; Neath, 2000). Recent studies 
have established that robust false memories also exist 
in STM (Atkins & Reuter-Lorenz, 2008; Coane et al., 
2007; Flegal, et al., 2010). These findings indicate that 
the mechanisms underlying false memories formation 
might be delay invariant. Interestingly, the findings are 
consistent with unitary models of memory which consist 
of delay-invariant storage and retrieval processes (Jonides 
et al., 2008; Nairne, 2002). In other words, both LTM and 
STM are affected by this type of distortion.
The aim of this experiment is to investigate the 
mechanisms of false memory formation within STM in a 
study that replicates and extends those by Flegal et al. 
(2010) and Macé and Caza (2011). On the one hand, Flegal 
et al. highlighted that there was no difference between 
false memories in both STM and LTM tasks, however they 
did not take into account the processing differences across 
these two memory stores (e.g. articulatory suppression to 
impede rehearsal of the material). In particular, rehearsal 
is an important factor for the creation and maintenance of 
STM (Atkinson & Schiffrin, 1968) and this was not explored 
in their study using mathematical verification, which does 
not requires rehearsal. In contrast, we asked participants 
to remember a pair of numbers as a concurrent memory 
task, where the digits had to be sub-vocally rehearsed 
to be maintained together with the words of the list 
(Baddeley et al., 1984; Atkins et al., 2011). On the other 
hand, Macé and Caza did use auditory presentation and 
took into account articulatory suppression, yet they used 
‘mixed’ lists of words (i.e. where words where associated 
to a common or not). Additionally, they were using lists of 
six words, which are toward the high-end of the STM span 
of 7 ± 2 (Miller, 1956). Therefore, long lists may have 
triggered memory processes beyond STM. Additionally, 
we investigated the role of the visual appearance of the 
stimuli by changing their font across presentation and 
testing. An effect of this manipulation would suggest that 
words underwent a very superficial processing based 
on visual appearance rather than ‘deeper’ semantic 
processing (Craik & Lockhart, 1972; Craik & Tulving, 
1975).  
In sum, here we employed a visual presentation of ‘purely’ 
themed 4-word lists, investigated the role of articulatory 
suppression (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Baddeley & Lewis, 
1981), and of the visual appearance of the probes (i.e. 
font). We predict that probes semantically related to the 
list will be falsely recognised at a higher rate than those 
unrelated (Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995; 
Brainerd et al., 1995; Gallo & Roediger, 2002). Moreover, 
we predict that articulatory suppression would lead to an 
increase in the false recognition of related probes and 
decrease in the correct recognition of target probes. 
To infer the level of stimulus processing, throughout the 
experiment the font of the probes was either maintained 
lowercase as within the list, or changed to uppercase. 
Prior studies on semantic memory have changed the 
font of the probe to infer the level of processing (i.e. 
visually and superficial, or semantically and deep), 
however such a manipulation has not been tested in the 
domain of false short-term memory (J.H. Coane, personal 
communication). Thus, in case of superficial processing, 
a font change from the lowercase of list to the uppercase 
of the probe would, for example, trigger more rejections 
of the related lures. In case of deeper processing (Craik 
& Tulving, 1975; Rhodes & Castel, 2008) we should not 
find such effect. 
We also included the remember-know rating (Tulving, 
1985) to investigate participants’ phenomenological 
experience associated to the generation of false 
memories. In particular we want to determine whether 
false memories are more associated to a conscious 
‘remembering’ of seeing the probe among the words of the 
list, or whether it is more connected to a vague ‘knowing’ 
that it was there –that is, without a conscious memory, 
but with a ‘feeling’ (see Slotnick & Schacter, 2004).
2. Method
Participants
We tested 66 undergraduate students (21 were males) 
of the Queen Mary University of London. Their age ranged 
from 19 to 22. Participants signed the consent form 
that was approved by the local Ethics Committee, thus 
complying with the Declaration of Helsinki on research 
ethics.
Procedure
Each participant was provided with a blank booklet 
containing seven pages. The first page was used for the 
age, sex, and answers to the two practice trials. Pages 
2-6 contained the space for answering the 96 trials. 
The final page contained questions about their overall 
impression of the experiment. Participants were all seated 
in a lecture-theatre where they viewed the screens on 
which the words were presented.
Each trial containing four semantically related words. 
Each list was followed by a Related, a Target, or an 
Unrelated probe (32 probes for each of the three types; 
see Figure 1). Lists were extracted from Flegal et al. 
(2010). The stimuli were presented in PowerPoint using 
the timing controls within the program to control stimulus 
duration.
In Block 1, in each trial participants were presented with 
a pair of numbers that they had to sub-vocally rehearse 
and then recall at the end of each trial. Then it followed 
the list of four words where each word was presented 
for one second on the screens. After a one-second 
pause, a probe word was presented for three seconds. 
Participants wrote down whether the probe word was 
‘Old’ (i.e. present in the list) or ‘New’. The font of the 
probe was either Lowercase (as for the words of the list) 
or Uppercase. After the probe was presented, participants 
were prompted for three seconds to write whether they 
‘Remembered’ the probe being showed on the screen (i.e. 
they could consciously remember it as displayed on the 
screen) or whether they more simply ‘Knew’ that it had 
been shown. The remembered-known statement was 
required only when the probe was considered Old. Finally, 
the ‘# #’ on the screen prompted participants to write 
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down the two numbers presented at the beginning of the 
trial (see Figure 1).
After the completion of Block 1, participants had a longer 
break before performing Block 2. Here participants were 
not presented with digits to rehearse; all the remaining 
details were the same is in Block 1, except that new lists 
were showed. The entire experiment took about 1 hour.
3. Results
For each participant we calculated the average number 
of errors across the twelve conditions (e.g. if the probe 
was judged as ‘New’ when it was actually ‘Old’ this was 
recorded as an error). Mean errors across participants are 
reported in Table 1. As a control for number rehearsal, 
we discarded the trials where participants could not 
remember the two rehearsed numbers. This was quite rare 
and involved less than 1% of the total number of trials. 
Our statistical approach involved an analysis of variance 
with the main factors covering the experimental design 
(e.g. type of rehearsal, type of probe, etc.); additionally 
interactions among main factors were further investigated 
by using Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc analyses. 
We performed a 2x3x2 within-subjects ANOVA on the 
average error rates with Block (articulatory suppression, 
or rehearsal), Probe Type (Related, Target, or Unrelated) 
and Case (Uppercase or Lowercase) as variables. We 
found a significant effect of the Block [F(1,64)=28.09, 
p<.01] where rehearsed lists were better performed 
(0.19 average error) than when there was articulatory 
suppression (0.47 average error). Probe Type was 
significant too [F(2,63)=41.46, p<.01] with Unrelated 
probes generating least errors (0.04 average error), 
Target probes being in between (0.34 average error), and 
Related probes generating most errors (0.61 average 
error). The Case was not significant [F(1,64)=1.76, 
p>.05]. Finally we found a significant interactions 
between Block and Probe Type [F(4,61)=13.21, p<.01], 
and across Block, Probe Type, and Case [F(6,60)=5.47, 
p<.05]. No other interaction reached the significant level. 
We corrected for the multiple comparisons by using the 
Bonferroni post-hoc analysis (see Figure 2). Block by 
Probe Type revealed that Related probes and articulatory 
suppression produced more errors than any other 
condition (0.90 average error), that Target probes with 
articulatory suppression produced the second biggest 
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Notes: Related Probes were words that had not been presented in the preceding list but that were semantically related to them, Target Probes were 
words that had been presented in preceding list, and Unrelated Probes were words that had not been presented in the preceding list and that were 
unrelated to them. In Block 2 there was not neither the presentation of the pair of digits (i.e. “9 3”) nor their test (i.e. “# #”).
THE JOURNAL OF NEUROBEHAVIORAL SCIENCES VOLUME 1  /  NUMBER 1  /  MARCH 2014
Figure 1:  The depiction of a trial in Block 1
1.2 Articulatory suppression •
Rehearsal •
0.8
.. 0.6C>e..
>
<C
0.4
0.2
11 II
0 .. h rI
Rei low Rei Up Tarlow Tar Up Unrel low Unrel Up
JN
BS
20
14
 P
ub
lis
he
d 
by
 U
sk
ud
ar
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
   
  w
w
w
.j
nb
s.
or
g
error rates (0.5 average error), while Unrelated probes 
in both Block 1 and 2 where the best performed (0.02 
and 0.06 average error respectively) [all p<.05]. In sum, 
post-hoc contrasts confirmed that articulatory suppression 
and Related probes produced more errors –namely, false 
memories. Finally, the interaction Block by Probe Type by 
Case confirmed that Related probes both Uppercase and 
Lowercase in Block 1, together with the Target Uppercase 
probes in Block 1 were those generating more errors [all 
p<.05] (see Figure 2).
We further analysed the phenomenological experience 
relative to the creation of false memories, thus focusing 
on the errors produced by the participants. Therefore, 
for the trials that did generate false memories across 
the Related and Unrelated conditions (i.e. when a New 
probe was judged as Old) we calculated how many times 
these erroneously  chosen probes were experienced 
as Remembered and how many were experienced 
as Known.  In other words we tried to determine the 
conscious experience associated to trials generating false 
memories. On these means it was performed a 2x2x2x2 
within-subjects ANOVA with Attribution (Remembered 
or Known), Block (articulatory suppression, or 
rehearsal), Probe Type (Related or Unrelated), and 
Case (Uppercase or Lowercase) as variables. Attribution 
was not significant [F(1,64)=1.62, p>.05]. Block was 
significant [F(1,64)=21.49, p<.01] indicating that 
articulatory suppression produced more Remember-Know 
judgements (i.e. errors) (2.79 on average) than when 
rehearsal was allowed (1.07 on average). Ultimately, 
this confirms that articulatory suppression produced 
more false memories (errors) than when rehearsal was 
allowed. We found a significant effect of the Probe Type 
[F(1,64)=89.23, p<.01], where Related probes triggered 
higher Remember-Know ratings (3.72 on average) than 
Unrelated probes (0.14 on average), thus confirming 
that Related probes produced more false memories. The 
case was not significant [F(1,64)<1]. The interaction 
Attribution by Probe Type was marginally significant 
[F(3,62)=2.79, p=.10]. We investigated this interaction 
with the Bonferroni post-hoc analysis and found that 
Related probes (i.e. those generating most of the false 
memories) were more often judged as ‘known’ rather 
than ‘remembered’ [p<.05]. Finally, the interaction Block 
by Probe Type was significant [F(3,62)=32.73, p<.01], 
that further confirmed that articulatory suppression 
and Related probes generated more Remember-Know 
judgements and thus more false memories. No other 
interaction was significant.      
4. Discussion
In the present study we investigated the factors 
influencing the generation of false memories in STM. We 
found that the main factors were: the Probe Type and 
the possibility to use sub-vocal rehearsal. Related probes 
generated more false memories than Unrelated probes. 
This is consistent with previous studies such as that by 
Atkins and Reuter-Lorenz (2008), Flegal et al. (2010), 
and Coane et al. (2007) who all observed a strong effect 
of Related lures in STM memory tasks. This suggests 
that semantic processing does occur at the STM level, 
thus that deep semantic processing occurs rapidly after 
stimulus presentation. These results expand the scope 
of theories such as the fuzzy trace theory (Brainerd et 
al., 1995) and the activation monitoring theory (Gallo & 
Roediger, 2002). The fuzzy trace theory hypothesises that 
the memory traces of the lists are actually fuzzy, and false 
memories are generated by the semantic relation shared 
by probes and the fuzzy traces of the list (Arndt, 2011). 
The activation monitoring theory (Gallo & Roediger, 
2002) proposes that the presentation of a probe causes 
an activation which spreads to the ‘neighbouring’ items 
stored within semantic memory (Collins & Loftus, 1975; 
Quillian, 1967). The spread of activation is monitored by 
processes which determine its ‘authenticity’ (i.e. that is, 
which distinguish between ‘real’ activation and the mere 
spread of activation from neighbours). False memories 
occur when a probe triggers a level of activation sufficient 
to bypass the monitoring processes (Gallo, 2006). 
Therefore, our results suggest that the same theories 
on false memories formation in LTM are valid for STM as 
well. In particular, considering the activation monitoring 
theory, the monitory process can be represented by the 
central executive component of the STM/working memory 
(Baddeley, 1986).
Additionally, another main result was the crucial role 
played by rehearsal in the accuracy of STM (see Macé 
& Caza, 2011). Thus, when participants were prevented 
from sub-vocally rehearsing the words of the list, this 
had an overall negative impact on STM performance. 
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        Block 1  
 
        Block 2  
  
Lower 
Case 
Upper 
Case   
Lower 
Case 
Upper 
Case 
Related Mean 0.98 0.82 
 
0.26 0.39 
(SD) (1.16) (0.88) 
 
(0.53) (0.76) 
Target 
 
Mean 0.33 0.67 
 
0.18 0.20 
(SD) (0.59) (1.09) 
 
(0.43) (0.47) 
Unrelated 
 
Mean 0.05 0 
 
0.05 0.08 
(SD) (0.21) (0)   (0.21) (0.32) 
	  
Notes: Mean and standard deviations error rates associated to the 
Block 1 (articulatory suppression) and Block 2 (rehearsal) across 
the three types of probes (Related, Target, and Unrelated) and the 
two type of case (Lowercase and Uppercase). 
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Notes: Average errors associated to the recognition task where ‘Articu-
latory suppression’ indicates Block 1 and ‘Rehearsal’ Block 2. Addi-
tionally, ‘Rel’ stands for Related probes, ‘Tar’ for Target probes, ‘Unrel’ 
for Unrelated probes, ‘Low’ for Lowercase, and ‘Up’ for Uppercase. 
Error bars represent the ± SE.
Figure 2: Recognition task resultsTable 1: The results for Block 1 and 2
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Baddeley’s working memory model (Baddeley, 1986) uses 
rehearsal to consolidate memory traces, thus articulatory 
suppression results in the failure of proper memory 
formation. Therefore, our results can be explained by the 
general cost produced by articulatory suppression, which 
can be even more deleterious when coupled with probes 
Related to the words of the list.
There was a weak effect of the font manipulation, 
suggesting that words underwent deep semantic 
processing (Craik & Tulving, 1975). The sole significant 
effect was to render more difficult the recognition of 
Target probes (i.e. words that were actually on the list) 
when sub-vocal rehearsal was suppressed (see Figure 
2). In this case, participants relied more on the visual 
features of the words to encode them in STM. Aside this 
effect, the significant level of false memories for Related 
probes implies that participants mainly encoded the 
words non-visually. This processing rapidity is supported 
by behavioural data on both semantic and non-semantic 
material (Kovács, 1996; Longtin &Meunier, 2005; Marr & 
Marr, 1976) and electrophysiological evidence (Penolazzi 
et al., 2007; Hinojosa et al., 2004).
The phenomenological experience more associated 
to false memories formation was of vaguely Knowing, 
rather than Remembering, that the probe was in the 
list. This is different from previous results (e.g. Flegal 
et al., 2010), reporting that false memories are more 
associated to consciously Remembering a Related probe 
being in the list. This difference perhaps arises from 
the more extensive manipulations to the stimuli: here 
participants had to deal with articulatory suppression, 
remembering antagonist material (pair of numbers), and 
changes in typeface in addition to the remembering the 
list of words and rejecting incorrect probes. This may 
have triggered a higher cognitive effort, resulting in the 
feeling that that the task was quite demanding and thus 
making participants less assertive in their judgements –
thus, preference for Knowing over Remembering. In fact, 
in support of this line of reasoning, Knowing was chosen 
more in the more demanding conditions (i.e. Related 
probes and articulatory suppression).
In sum, the present study provides further evidence that 
the creation of false memories can occur in STM (Coane 
et al., 2007; Flegal et al., 2010) by showing that semantic 
processing is already taking place and that visual cues 
associated to the stimuli are irrelevant, thus supporting 
the hypothesis that semantic processing occurs early. 
Future studies should address if such early ‘high level’ 
processing is performed at the level of primary sensory 
cortices, which are thought to be involved only in basic 
perceptive aspects. This may not be too surprising as the 
attribute of the sensory specificity (e.g. primary visual 
cortex specific for visual input) seems to fade (Ghazanfar 
& Schroeder, 2006; Pasqualotto & Proulx, 2012). 
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